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1. Introduction  
This chapter discusses some approaches to computational modelling of decision making. 
Concretely, it concerns with connectionist models of decision making and it contributes to 
the categorization of such models. The models presented in this chapter are algorithmic and 
structural descriptions of the mental process of decision making. 
First of all, there are some definitions that must be stated in this chapter. A decision occurs 
when a person faces several options (alternatives), then evaluates the consequences of 
choosing each alternative and, finally, selects one depending on her/his preferences 
(Rustichini, 2009). Preference is an abstract relation between two options: when presented 
with options A1 and A2, it is assumed that a subject either prefers A1 to A2 or the subject 
prefers A2 to A1 (or is indifferent between them). The decision is guided by the subjective 
experience and preference of the subject. It depends on internal factors of the subject and 
external factors of the environment. Due to these considerations, the goodness of a decision 
is subjective and it should be considered only within the context of the subject and the 
environment. The parameters that characterized each alternative are called criteria. 
A model is a simpler and more abstract version of a system that keeps its key features while 
omitting less relevant details. It is used to investigate a system or phenomenon that is too 
complex to deal with directly. An important class of models is represented by 
computational models (Fum et al., 2007), which are implemented as algorithms. While 
statistical and mathematical models describe a phenomenon without reproducing it, 
computational models do. Therefore, computational models make easier the observation 
and measurement of a phenomenon’s behaviour. 
There are two opposite points of view concerning how the human mind works (Chown, 
2004). One considers the basis of human mind as a symbol processing system and the other 
assumes that the brain must be modelled in neural terms. This chapter is focused on 
connectionism, which is a theoretical framework for cognition that assumes two main 
statements. The first one is that cognitive phenomena arise from the propagation of 
activation among nodes. The second is that such propagation is mediated by weighted 
connections between nodes. So, computational models built on connectionism principles are 
composed by nodes and connections. A node represents an entity (idea, concept, etc.) which 
has an associated value (activation). A node can transmit its activation through its 
connections. One node can either excite or inhibit another node depending on the strength 
of the connection that links them. Thus, a connectionist model must specify, among other 
things, the way nodes transmit activation. 
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There are neuropsychological evidences that suggest that the human mechanism for making 
a decision is divided into two stages (Glimcher, 2009). The first stage lies in the assessment 
of all alternatives and the second is concerned with choosing one of them depending of the 
value assigned in the previous stage. The assessment mechanism is associated with the 
representation of values, while the choice mechanism is associated with a process that takes 
these values and returns the best alternative. These mechanisms are the core of the models 
presented in this chapter. These evidences confirm the Prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), which distinguishes two phases in the choice process: an early phase of 
editing and a subsequent phase of evaluation. The editing phase consists of a preliminary 
analysis of the offered options, which often yields a simpler representation of these options. 
In the second phase, the edited options are evaluated and the option of highest value is 
chosen. 
There are several models that describe the decision process. Depending on the application, 
different constraints may be enforced on the computational modelling task. This chapter 
deals with the following categories of models. Threshold Models make a decision when 
there is sufficient evidence accumulated favouring one alternative over the others. Ranking 
models rank the alternatives according to their estimated consequences and then choose the 
best one. Rule-based models apply rules to choose the best alternative. Emotional models 
take into account emotion in the decision process. Physiologically motivated models aim to 
describe the decision process using interconnected modules which represent different brain 
areas. An important remark is that some of the models presented in this chapter fall into 
more than one category.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the category of Threshold Models 
and explains different models within this category. In section 3 there are some Ranking 
models. Section 4 describes Rule-based models. Section 5 contains different models that 
include emotions in the process of decision making. Some physiologically motivated models 
are compiled in section 6. Finally, section 7 presents the conclusions. 
2. Threshold Models 
Threshold Models assume that decisions are based on accumulated information about the 
alternatives. Therefore, a decision is the result of continuously accumulating information 
until a threshold is reached. Threshold Models emulate the decision process as a race 
between alternatives, with the response determined by the first alternative to reach a 
threshold. The threshold that determines the amount of information needed for a response 
is under the control of the needs of the decision maker (the subject that makes the decision). 
For instance, the threshold is reduced with the necessity to respond quickly and increased 
with the necessity to respond accurately. Two main features of these models are the starting 
value of the accumulation process and the thresholds. The interest of these models is that 
they provide a description of the relationship between time and accuracy, and hence they 
are suitable for modelling speed-accuracy decision effects. In the following sections different 
Threshold Models are discussed. 
Within the category of Threshold Models there are differences in how the accumulation is 
assumed to occur. These models contain a node, which is called accumulator, for each 
alternative, i.e. the information favouring each alternative is accumulated separately. 
Threshold Models gather information through other kind of nodes that represents 
environmental and subject’s features. In Dependent Accumulators models, information in 
www.intechopen.com
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favour of one alternative is the evidence against the others. Thus, the accumulators are 
mutually inhibitory. There is another class in which accumulators are independent and 
there is no inhibition: Independent Accumulators models. 
2.1 Decision field theory 
Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) is a dynamic model of decision 
making that has been used to explain different aspects of the decision process such as the 
similarity effect, the attraction effect, the compromise effect and preference reversals (Roe et 
al., 2001; Johnson & Busemeyer, 2005). This model assumes that the decision process can be 
formulated as a connectionist model as shown in figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Diagram showing the connectionist model of Decision Field Theory (DFT) which 
deals with a decision making problem consisting in three alternatives: A1, A2 and A3 
Information about the various possible consequences of each alternative represents the 
inputs into the model (Ci), i.e. criteria. The input criteria are filtered by an attention process, 
which maps the evaluations of consequences into a momentary evaluation for each 
alternative, represented by the second layer of nodes. Then the momentary evaluations are 
transformed into valences, one for each alternative, represented by the third layer of nodes. 
The valence of an alternative represents the momentary advantage or disadvantage of that 
alternative compared to the other alternatives. Finally, the valences are input to a recursive 
system at the final layer which generates the accumulation of information favouring each 
alternative at each moment in time. Decision Field Theory calls preferences to the values 
accumulated in the last layer. In this model, as attention switches across criteria over time, 
the accumulation of information also varies until the preference for one alternative exceeds 
the threshold and the winner is chosen. 
The assessment mechanism lies in the first layer where information is gathered and criteria 
are weighted. The choice mechanism lies in the accumulation process through the last three 
layers of the model. This model is an example of a Dependent Accumulators model due to 
the connections between accumulators in the last layer. Notice that there exists inhibition. 
Contrasts Valences Preferences Weights 
A1 
A2 
A3 
C1 
C2 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A1 
A2 
A3 
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2.2 Leaky, competing accumulators 
The model presented in this section is based on the Leaky, Competing Accumulator model 
(Usher & McClelland, 2001) and operates as follows. At each time step, one criterion (Ci) of 
the consequences of the alternatives is chosen randomly to be the focus of attention. 
Therefore, the selected criterion is the only one that transmits its activation. The input to 
each of the Leaky, Competing Accumulator nodes (accumulators) is determined by an input 
pre-processing stage. This stage calculates the differences (dij) between all pairs of 
alternatives over the chosen criterion and then, converts these differences before 
transmitting them to the accumulators. This stage is performed in the second and third 
layer. The nodes in the second layer represent each alternative according to its weights over 
the criteria and transmit their activation to the third layer. The nodes in the third layer 
compute and transform the differences between the alternatives and, finally, transmit them 
to the last layer, which contains the accumulators.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Scheme illustrating the leaky competing accumulator model incorporating switching 
of attention for a choice between three alternatives (A1, A2 and A3) and two criteria (C1 and 
C2)  
Figure 2 illustrates this model for a situation with three alternatives and two criteria. The 
model presented in this section (Usher & McClelland, 2004) extended the Leaky, Competing 
Accumulator model of perceptual choice incorporating switching of attention between criteria. 
As in the Decision Field Theory, the assessment mechanism lies in the first layer and the 
choice mechanism consists in accumulating information through the different layers of the 
model. This model is another instance of a Dependent Accumulators model. 
2.3 Accumulator Model 
The accumulator Model (Vickers 1970; Smith & Vickers, 1988) deals with decisions that have 
two alternatives. In this model there is no inhibition between the two accumulators. Each 
Input preprocessing Accumulators Criteria 
A1 
A2 
A3 
C1 
C2 
d12 
d21 
d32 
A1 
A2 
A3 
d31 
d13 
d23 
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criterion (Ci) characterizing the alternatives (Ai) has associated a reference value (Ri). At each 
time step, one criterion is selected randomly and if its value is greater than the reference 
value, then the model adds the difference between the reference and the value to one 
accumulator. If the value is lower than the reference, then the model adds the difference to 
the other accumulator. The decision is determined by the first accumulator to reach the 
threshold. Figure 3 shows a connectionist interpretation of this model that contains two 
accumulators, one for each alternative, and two criteria. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Scheme showing the accumulator model for a choice consisting in two alternatives 
(A1 and A2) and two criteria (C1 and C2)  
In this model, the choice mechanism is represented in the accumulation process and the 
assessment mechanism is based on the representation of the criteria. Notice that there is no 
inhibition between accumulators. 
3. Ranking models 
This approach makes the assumption that there is a global comparison of the alternatives. 
These models lie in the evaluation of the alternatives over each criterion and the 
determination of a score for each alternative. After this process of assessment, they 
determine a global ranking on the alternatives based on the scores. The decision is stated by 
the alternative with the best score. One of the most difficult tasks is to normalize the original 
values of the criteria, i.e. the assessment mechanism. 
Within the category of Ranking models there are differences in how the global score is 
computed. For instance, a model built on these principles can lie in computing the weighted 
sum of some partial scores given by the criteria that characterize the alternatives. This 
chapter presents different Ranking models in the following sections. 
3.1 Fuzzy cognitive map 
A fuzzy cognitive map (Kosko, 1986) is a technique for modelling complex systems that 
consists of a great number of highly related and interconnected elements. Fuzzy cognitive 
maps represent knowledge capturing the cause and effect relationships among elements in 
order to model the behaviour of a system. The first fuzzy cognitive maps used numbers to 
describe causality and introduced positive and negative concepts. Fuzzy cognitive maps 
have been extended in order to be applied to decision making (Montibeller & Belton, 2009). 
References Accumulators Criteria 
R1 
R2 
C1 
C2 
A1 
A2 
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Fig. 4. Competitive fuzzy cognitive map for a choice consisting in three alternatives (A1, A2 
and A3) and three criteria (C1, C2 and C3) 
A kind of fuzzy cognitive map developed for decision making is called competitive fuzzy 
cognitive map (Stylios et al., 2008). The competitive fuzzy cognitive map introduced the 
distinction of two main kinds of concepts: decision concepts and factor concepts. Figure 4 
illustrates a competitive fuzzy cognitive map that includes three alternatives (A1, A2 and A3) 
and several criteria (C1, C2 and C3). All the nodes can interact with each other and determine 
the value of the alternatives, which are mutually exclusive, in order to indicate always a 
single decision. The connections between concepts represent the causal relations among 
them. This model operates as follows. The model assigns the activation of factor nodes 
according to the decision making problem. These nodes are the input of the model. Then, 
the model begins a simulation divided in time steps. At each simulation step, the activation 
of a node is calculated by computing the influence of the interconnected nodes on the 
specific one following a sigmoid threshold function. The simulation finishes when there are 
no variations in the activation of every node. In such situation, when the competitive fuzzy 
cognitive map has converged, the decision node that has the greatest activation represents 
the best alternative. 
In this model the assessment mechanism is represented by the propagation of activation 
through the nodes of the map representing criteria and the choice mechanism consists in 
selecting the alternative associated to the best scored decision node. Notice that there is an 
inhibition between alternatives. This is not a Threshold model because the decision is not 
made when a decision node reaches a threshold. Instead of it, the decision is made when the 
map has converged. 
3.2 Hybrid model 
The model presented in (Iglesias et al., 2008a) is composed of an artificial weighted net of 
concepts, an evolution module, a transformation module and a assessment module. The net 
of concepts represent the environment and the expert knowledge about the criteria involved 
in a decision. A net concept stands for a criterion (Ci) or an event (Ei) whose value may 
depend on the values of other different events. The association weights between net 
concepts, like in the rest of the presented models, are considered as a level of influence of 
the source concept on the destination concept.  
C1 
C2 
A1 
A2 
A3 
C3 
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Fig. 5. Connections between the net of concepts, the evolution module, the transformation 
module and the assessment module. The different nodes represent events (E1, E2 and E3), 
criteria (C1 and C2), predicted criteria (A11, A12, A21 and A22), discrete values (T11, T12, T21 and 
T22) and alternatives (A1 and A2). 
The evolution module takes the values of the criteria stored in the net of concepts and 
modifies them depending on each alternative. This module predicts the environment 
evolution, i.e. the consequences a decision would produce over the environment and hence, 
over the values of the criteria. The transformation module applies a fuzzy transformation 
(Tij) to obtain three discrete values (maximum, most possible and minimum value) from 
each evolved criterion. Finally, the assessment module takes the discrete values and scored 
each alternative using one of three evaluation methods: the general fuzzy method, a fuzzy 
method based on eigenvectors or influence diagrams. The assessment module ranks the 
alternatives depending on the score computed by the selected evaluation method and 
chooses the best alternative. 
As figure 5 shows, the assessment mechanism of this model lies in the first three layers. The 
choice mechanism is represented by the evaluation method applied in the assessment layer. 
4. Rule-based models 
These models assume that multiple decision rules coexist in the brain. Some rules are based 
on heuristics and other rules involve deliberative calculation. On the one hand, heuristics 
rules allow decision makers to avoid irrelevant information and make fast decisions. On the 
other hand, deliberative rules allow decision makers to evaluate complex situations in order 
to extract relevant information. 
An example of this category of models is DECIDER (Levine, 2009). This model is composed 
of a module that represents the decision maker’s needs and a module of decision rules. The 
C1
E2 
E4
E1 
C2
E3 
A11
A21
A1 
A2 
A12
A22
T11
T21
T12
T22
Net of concepts Evolution 
module 
Transformation 
module 
Assessment 
module 
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state of the needs module determines which rule must be applied through the orienting 
module. Depending on the pattern identified by the network contained in each rule module, 
the model applies the corresponding rule. Figure 6 shows a simplified version of DECIDER.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Diagram that illustrates a simplify version of DECIDER 
The assessment mechanism is compiled in the needs module that establishes which rule 
must be applied. The choice mechanism lies in the rule that chooses the best alternative. 
5. Emotional models 
Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidences demonstrate that emotions are an 
indispensable requirement for deciding properly (Damasio, 1994; Simón, 1998; Pessoa, 
2008). Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the participation of emotions in decision 
processes. There are several models that include emotions in the decision process in order to 
describe better the decision mechanisms. The following section presents a representative 
instance of these models. 
5.1 Integrated cognitive-motivational network 
This section introduces a model for integrating cognition and emotion into a single decision 
process (Busemeyer et al. 2007). This model is an extension of the Decision Field Theory 
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). The momentary evaluations of the Decision Field Theory 
are affected here in this model by emotions. The effect of a criterion on a momentary 
evaluation of a consequence depends on two factors: the quality and the need for the 
criterion. The quality represents the amount of satisfaction that a consequence can deliver 
with respect to a criterion. This model assumes that a subject has an ideal reference on each 
criterion as well as a current level of achievement for a criterion. The need is the difference 
between the reference and the current level of achievement for a criterion. The need for a 
criterion varies across time. These two factors, the quality and the need, are combined to 
produce a motivational value for a criterion. Then, motivational values are associated with 
the corresponding decision weights to compute the momentary evaluation. 
A scheme of the integrated cognitive-motivational network that shows the influence of 
emotions in the decision process is shown in figure 7. This model also belongs to the 
C1 C2 
Orienting 
module 
C3 
Complex rules 
module 
Heuristics 
module 
Needs module 
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category of Threshold Models because the node called preferences accumulates information 
about each alternative as in the Decision Field Theory. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Cognitive-motivational network 
6. Physiologically motivated models 
Physiologically motivated models aim to describe the decision process using several 
interconnected modules which represent different brain areas (e.g. orbitofrontal cortex, 
amygdala, etc.). There are some brain areas closely related with decision making. One of 
them is the amygdala, which is capable of assigning emotional meaning to environmental 
stimuli. The following sections describe some of those models. 
6.1 Neural affective decision theory 
This theory specifies brain mechanisms underlying decision making. It lies in four 
principles: affect, brain, assessment and framing. Affect means that decision making is a 
cognitive affective process dependent on emotional evaluation of alternatives. The brain 
principle represents that decision making is a neural process driven by coordinated 
interactions among several brain areas. Assessment suggests that the brain computes 
preferences via two distinct mechanisms for positive and negative outcomes. Framing 
defines that judgments and decisions vary depending on the presentation of information. 
A representative model of this theory is ANDREA (Litt et al., 2008). ANDREA is divided 
into seven different modules that represent major brain areas that contribute to the 
assessment and choice mechanisms: the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulated 
cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the ventral striatum, midbrain dopaminergic neurons 
and serotonergic neurons centered in the dorsal raphe nucleus of the brainstem. Figure 8 
illustrates the connectivity scheme between the different modules. 
This model describes a biological mechanism for decision making. The assessment 
mechanism lies in the input to the modules representing the amygdale and the orbitofrontal 
cortex. The choice mechanism is based on the recurrent connections between all the 
modules. This model is also in the category of ranking models. 
Quality
Valences 
Achievement
Needs
Momentary 
Evaluations 
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Values 
Decision 
Weights 
Reference 
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Fig. 8. Scheme of the ANDREA model (5-HT: dorsal raphe serotonergic neurons, ACC:  
anterior cingulated cortex, AMYG: amygdala, DA: midbrain dopaminergic neurons, DLPFC: 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, OFC: orbitofrontal cortex, VS: the ventral striatum) 
6.2 GAGE 
Another physiologically motivated model presented in (Wagar & Thagard, 2004) is GAGE. 
The individual neurons in GAGE are more realistic than those used in most artificial neural 
network models because they exhibit the spiking behaviour found in real neurons. GAGE 
organizes neurons into populations related to brain areas, including the 
ventromedialprefrontal cortex (VMPFC), the hippocampus, the amygdala, the nucleus 
accumbens and the ventral tegmental area. Figure 9 illustrates a diagram of the neuronal 
mechanism developed in GAGE. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Scheme of the GAGE model (VMPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex, NAcc: nucleus 
accumbens, VTA: ventral tegmental area, HIP: hippocampus, AMY: amygdala) 
The node representing the ventromedial prefrontal cortex receives the inputs to the model 
so it contains the assessment mechanism. The choice mechanism is finally set by the nucleus 
accumbens, which is the node with the output of the model. This model is an instance of a 
ranking model. 
VMPFC
NAcc 
VTA HIP 
AMY 
AMYG
DLPFC
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6.3 Recurrent network model 
The model detailed in (Lo & Wang, 2006) consists of three brain areas: the cortex, the 
superior colliculus and the basal ganglia. These brain areas are represented as neural 
networks. Each of the three networks contains competing neural populations for each 
alternative. Neural populations compete with each other through local recurrent synaptic 
inhibition. The cortical neurons slowly accumulate information about criteria. The neural 
population receiving a stronger input has a higher probability of reaching a threshold and 
winning the competition. 
Figure 10 shows the model architecture. Neural pools in the cortical network integrate 
sensory information about criteria and also compete against each other. They propagate 
activation to both the superior colliculus and the basal ganglia. The superior colliculus 
provides the output that represents the winner alternative. 
This model is an example of a Threshold model that is also physiologically motivated. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Schematic model architecture (continuous lines represent positive or excitatory 
connections while doted lines represent negative or inhibitory connections) 
7. Conclusion 
The categorization just presented here compiles existing connectionist models related to 
decision making. The identification of the best model depends on the task to which it will be 
applied. The evaluation of decision making models is typically conducted experimentally, 
rather than analytically. There are two main ways to evaluate a model experimentally. The 
first way lies in computing the ability of the model to take the right decision, i.e. the decision 
that produces the best outcome. However, there is another interesting way of evaluation 
which seeks to calculate the ability of the model to take the same decisions as a human being 
does on a well-defined task. Therefore, if the goal is to find the model that best describes the 
decision process of human beings, then it might be used the second kind of evaluation. This 
Superior 
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Basal Ganglia Cortical 
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second way of evaluation is often used to validate a model, suggesting that a good fit to 
human performance is good evidence for the theory implemented by the model. 
In this chapter there are several models that have been applied on different tasks, so it is 
very difficult to compare them. Threshold Models are often used in decision making 
problems where time and accuracy are the two most important features. A representative 
task of this kind is the two-alternative forced choice task (Bogacz et al., 2006). The 
competitive fuzzy cognitive map is used as a medical decision support system in differential 
diagnosis. The hybrid model presented in (Iglesias et al., 2008a) is applied in fire 
emergencies in order to choose the best action to mitigate a crisis. DECIDER is used to 
model preference reversals by consumers deciding among competing soft drinks. In 
(Busemeyer et al., 2007), the model is applied in a situation where a motorcyclist is driving 
towards an obstacle and she/he must decide what to do. ANDREA is used to predict 
decisions in problems where a human being has to choose between two different lotteries 
regarding the possible gains and loses and their probabilities. GAGE is used to simulate 
experimental results concerning the Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994). Finally, the 
model detailed in (Lo & Wang, 2006) has been applied in reaction time tasks similar to the 
two-alternative forced choice task. It would be very useful to present every model within 
the context of the same decision making problem. One possibility is the use of a simple 
problem like the one presented in (Iglesias et al., 2008b) that lies in choosing the best means 
of transport. With this decision making problem, the comparison of the models would be 
easier and the differences on the theories that they implemented could be more notable. 
It seems that in neuroscience and psychology is growing the use of physiologically 
motivated models as a tool to both test and develop theories. This kind of models explicitly 
contains modules representing different brain areas. This feature is very suitable in imaging 
studies that measures brain activity such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (De 
Martino et al., 2006). It is frequent to find correlations between psychological measures and 
measures of brain activity (Kahneman, 2009). Therefore, the similarity between brain 
activities and the values of the model parameters can be interpreted as a clue in the 
validation of the model. 
An important characteristic of a decision making model must be its ability to explain the 
decisions that it makes. None of the models presented in this chapter seeks the explanation 
of its decisions. A model developed by the authors of this chapter which aims to explain its 
decisions while making the same decisions of human beings obtained the second position in 
the Dynamic Stocks and Flows challenge (Lebiere et al., 2009). The model presented at the 
challenge is a connectionist model of decision making and it belongs to the Ranking models 
category. This result confirms that this connectionist model can both explain its decisions 
and simulate human performance. The explanations of the decisions may lead to better 
understanding of decision making and they will soon play an important role in the process 
of studying how people decide. 
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